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Abstract: Ground offers the hope of vindicating and illuminating an
classic philosophical idea: the layered conception, according to which
reality is structured by relations of dependence, with physical phe-
nomena on the bottom, upon which chemistry, then biology, and psy-
chology reside. However, ground can only make good on this promise
if it is appropriately formally behaved. The paradigm of good formal
behavior can be found in the currently dominant grounding orthodoxy,
which holds that ground is transitive, antisymmetric, irreflexive, and
foundational. However, heretics have recently challenged the ortho-
doxy. In this paper, I examine ground’s ability to vindicate the layered
conception upon various relaxations of the orthodox assumptions. I
argue that highly unorthodox views of ground can still vindicate the
layered conception and that, in some ways, the heretical views enable
ground to better serve as a guide to reality’s layering than do orthodox
views of ground.
∗Thanks are due to two anonymous referees for extremely helpful comments and sug-
gestions, and to Ricki Bliss and Graham Priest for inviting me to think about these topics
and contribute to this volume.
1
1 Introduction
Our world contains a shocking variety of stuff, from the very large (planets,
quasars, galaxies) to the very small (quarks, leptons, bosons), with lots in be-
tween (koalas, canyons, coins). Here’s a common thought: All this stuff can
be organized into a hierarchy of levels. The galaxies and quasars are “on top”,
the canyons and koalas lie in the middle, below them come molecular com-
pounds, and at the very bottom are the tiny particles and other phenomena
(nuclear forces, electromagnetism) discussed in fundamental physics. The
idea of “levels” in the special sciences reflects this hierarchical conception of
the world. In the layering of special sciences, physics occupies the bottom,
with chemistry, then biology, then psychology, then economics, lying on top.
What makes one phenomenon “higher” than another? One answer is
that a relation of dependence creates the hierarchical structure. Psychology
depends on biology, which depends on chemistry, which depends on physics.
Of course, it’s not the sciences themselves that depend on each other (psy-
chology predates chemistry), but rather the phenomena the sciences study.
Which psychological states I have depends on which biological states I have,
but not vice versa. Which biological states I have depends on which chemical
states I have, but not vice versa. Et cetera. Let’s use the phrase ‘the layered
conception of reality’ (‘the layered conception’ for short) as a label for the
general idea that reality is layered in a hierarchy structured by relations of
dependence. We can add a claim about fundamentality to the layered con-
ception: the lower tiers of the layering are more fundamental than the higher
tiers. I will make this further assumption in what follows.
Much philosophical ink has been recently spilled inquiring into the nature
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of ground. Ground is alleged to be a/the relation of metaphysical depen-
dence, explanation, and/or priority. It is that relation the physicalist alleges
to hold between the mental and the physical, that the utilitarian claims holds
between moral facts and the facts about pleasure and pain, and that many
claim to hold between the fact that P and the fact that P or Q. In each case,
the ground makes the grounded obtain. The grounded metaphysically de-
pends on, is metaphysically explained by, and/or is ontologically posterior to,
the ground. Ground should be distinguished from from causal dependence.
Ground often (and perhaps always) holds synchronically, between two relata
at the same time. For example, the physicalist claims that my current pain
is grounded in my current brain state. In contrast, causal dependence relates
items across time. The dualist can admit that my past brain state caused
my current pain, while denying that pain is grounded in the brain.1
Once we have a notion of ground on board, it seems natural to slot that
notion into the layered conception. After all, relations of dependence generate
the layering, and ground is metaphysical dependence. Voila! Let’s plug
in everything we’ve learned in all the literature on ground to generate the
layered picture of the world. Theorists of ground have had exactly this idea
(deRosset [2013]). In fact, much of the appeal of the notion of ground, and its
recent rise to prominency in metaphysics, comes from the intuitive appeal of
the layered conception. Using ground to generate a hierarchy of dependence,
and thereby vindicate the layered conception, is a nice thought, but it faces
serious obstacles.
1I leave open the possibility that causation might, in the end, turn out to be a form
of ground. Or vice versa. But prima facie, they look different, despite sharing some
similarities.
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Only a relation with certain formal features is capable of delivering the
layered conception of the world. For example, a layered hierarchy generated
by a relation that loops will contain X above Y, above Z, but X will appear
again down below Z! Loops aren’t amenable to creating the type of structure
characteristic of the layered conception. Thankfully, the orthodox views on
ground hold that ground has several features that ensure that ground will be
able to provide the structure characteristic of the layered conception. Let’s
label the conjunction of the following four theses ‘the orthodoxy’. (All of
these claims should be interpreted as preceded by universal quantifiers ∀X,
∀Y, ∀Z. ):
(TS) Transitivity: If X grounds Y and Y grounds Z, then X grounds Z.
(AS) Antisymmetry: If X grounds Y, then Y does not ground X.
(IR) Irreflexivity: X does not ground X.
(FD) Foundationalism: Everything is ultimately grounded in a bottom
layer with no further ground.2
A relation that is transitive and antisymmetric cannot contain loops.
This takes care of the worry that ground might generate loops, and thereby
be unable to vindicate the layered conception. Or does it? The problem
here is that every component of the orthodoxy has been challenged. Schaffer
[2012] denies transitivity. Barnes [MS] denies antisymmetry. Jenkins [2011]
2This constraint sometimes goes under the banner that ground must be “well-founded”
(Schaffer [2010]: 37). This is an unfortunate choice of terminology: a relation of ground
that is not well-founded in the set-theoretic sense can still have a foundation. For clari-
fication of these issues and of what “well-founded” amounts to when it comes to ground,
cf. Rabin & Rabern [2015].
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questions irreflexivity. Bliss [2014] even argues that ground might generate
loops!
For the most part, theorists have either ignored the alleged counterexam-
ples and continued to insist on the orthodoxy, or fought against the coun-
terexamples outright (e.g. Litland [2013]). A major reason for maintaining
the orthodoxy in the face of alleged counterexamples is the worry that with-
out the formal features the orthodoxy provides, ground will provide unable
to vindicate the layered conception. In the rest of this paper, my goal will be
to alleviate this worry. I will argue that, even without any of the formal fea-
tures listed above - transitivity, asymmetry, irreflexivity, or foundationalism
- ground can still provide the dependence structure the layered conception
requires. In fact, I will argue that relaxing the assumptions in the orthodoxy
actually makes ground better able to generate the structure characteristic of
the layered conception.
Here’s a roadmap for the remainder of the paper. In the next section (2:
“Ground as the Generator as Layers”), we put some flesh on the bones of
the idea of the layered conception and how ground interacts with it. Each
of sections 3-6 explores how ground fares in its ability to vindicate the lay-
ered conception under the relaxation of some element of the orthodoxy. We
consider abandoning well-foundedness, anti-symmetry, irreflexivity, and tran-
sitivity (in that order). The conclusory Section 7 steps back to consider the
resulting overall picture.
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2 Ground as the Generator of Layers
The layered conception is admittedly vague. In this section, we examine ways
to put flesh on the bones of the bare idea and how we might utilize ground
to elucidate the structure the layered conception mandates.
The layered conception, at first pass, looks something like this:
economics
psychology
biology
chemistry
physics
As I mentioned before, the claim is not that the sciences themselves, con-
sidered as fields of inquiry, depend on each other. Economists can and should
go about their business without asking chemists for instructions. Instead, the
phenomena studied by one field of inquiry depend on, and are determined by,
phenomena studied by another field of inquiry. But that is not quite right.
Biology depends on chemistry, but the camouflage in Arabian cuttlefish (a
biological process) has absolutely nothing to do with the oxidization of steel
beams (a chemical process) in a shipyard in New Orleans. Most particular
concrete biological happenings have nothing to do with, and certainly don’t
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depend on, most particular concrete chemical happenings. The same is true
at the level of types. It’s likely that the biological phenomenon of cuttlefish
camouflage has nothing to with the chemical process of oxidization. (The
marine biologists could prove me wrong here, but I feel like I’m on safe
ground.)
However, the camouflage patterns of a particular cuttlefish do depend on
some chemical facts about that particular cuttlefish. And the camouflage of
a different cuttlefish depends on chemical facts about that cuttlefish. Fur-
thermore, the two instances of cuttlefish camouflage might depend on the
very same type (not token) of chemical property - call it ‘C’. If the pattern
is widespread, then we might claim a dependence of cuttlefish camouflage
on chemical property C. This yields a lesson. We infer dependencies be-
tween types of properties from patterns in dependencies of particular tokens
of those properties.
We now come to ground. Ground is typically understood as a depen-
dence relation between particular facts, states of affairs, particulars, or prop-
erties. The mass of this table is grounded in the mass of these four legs
and this table-top. Ground gives us the particular instances of dependency.
From these particular token-dependencies we can infer the type-dependencies
characteristic of the layered conception.
Sometimes, the type-dependencies are specific, such as when the firing
of neurons is grounded in an electrical imbalance between positively charged
potassium ions and negatively charged sodium. But these cases are rare.
More often, the dependency is not specific, and a higher-level type, such as
cuttlefish camouflage, does not depend on only one lower-level type, such
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as potassium/sodium interaction. In each particular case of cuttlefish cam-
ouflage, there is some chemical processes underlying it. But it needn’t be
the same type of chemical process in each case. These points are familiar
from research on multiple realizability. Most phenomena are realizable, or
groundable, in a wide variety of underlying lower-level phenomena. The var-
ious lower-level phenomena that all give rise to a single type of higher-level
phenomenon might have little in common, other than the fact that they
ground, or give rise to, the same type of higher-level happenings. Of course,
these lower-level happenings, despite their dissimilarities, remain, e.g., chem-
ical. So at the very least, we can say that cuttlefish camouflage, even if it
does not depend on any particular chemical type, depends on “chemistry”,
or “the chemical level”.
Call a complete story of the world’s grounding relations between partic-
ular facts a grounding graph (so-called because it can be represented by a
graph in the mathematical sense: a set of nodes with directed relations be-
tween them). The grounding graph gives us both more and less than we want
from the layered conception. It gives us more because it gives us thousands of
cuttlefish camouflage dependences - one for each cuttlefish. That’s more than
we need. But the grounding graph also gives us less. The layered conception
says that biology is above chemistry. This entails that cuttlefish x’s biological
camouflage is above cuttlefish y’s chemical properties. But grounding rela-
tions don’t deliver this verdict. There are no grounding relations between
the two. In mathematical terms, the layering conception seems to demand
a total order, in which every pair of items is related by either the “higher
than”, “lower than”, or “at the same level as” relation. In contrast, ground
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is a (very) partial order. A randomly chosen pair of items is unlikely to be
related by ground at all. There’s no easy recipe for generating a total order
from a partial order.
However, there are reasons to be optimistic that the ordering character-
istic of the layered conception can be gleaned from the grounding graph.
First, as discussed above, we can look for patterns in the particular ground-
ing claims. There are many such patterns. Sometimes the patterns are
specific (neural firing depends on potassium-sodium ion imbalance). Other
times they are not (each instance of cuttlefish camouflage depends on some
chemical property). But the patterns are there. If they weren’t, the layered
conception wouldnt be so appealing in the first place. Second, we may not
want the layered conception to deliver a total ordering. Both geology and
psychology are above chemistry. Neither lies above the other. Two options
remain: (i) they are at the same level or (ii) they are incommensurable.
chemistry
psychology geology
Figure 1: Option (i): geology and psychology on the same level, equally
fundamental.
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chemistry
psychology geology
Figure 2: Option (ii): geology and psychology incommensurable, neither
more, nor less, nor equally fundamental.
If the layered conception demands a total ordering, then (i) is the only
option. A total ordering does not permit cases in which two items are in-
commensurable. However, I think that option (ii) is preferable, and that we
should give up the idea that the layered conception requires a total order-
ing. Here’s why. It remains open to discover some other range of phenom-
ena, below psychology, but which contains no grounding relations to geology.
Computation provides a potential example. If all psychological phenomena
are ultimately grounded in computational phenomena (a not implausible hy-
pothesis), then psychology will lie above computation. Suppose we choose
option (i), placing geology on the same level with psychology. Ground tells
us to place computation below psychology, which we’ve placed on the same
level as geology. We’re now forced to put computation below geology. This
seems wrong. The relation between computational phenomena and geolog-
ical phenomena is exactly the same as the relation between psychological
phenomena and geological phenomena: nil. Whatever the reasons in favor
of placing psychology and geology on the same level were, exactly the same
reasons apply to placing computation and geology on the same level. It
would be arbitrary to place geology and psychology on the same level with
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computation below, rather than, say, geology and computation on the same
level, with psychology above.
The desire to place neither geology nor psychology above the other can
be satisfied without placing them at the same level in the layered conception.
Instead, we should give up the idea that the layered conception mandates
a total ordering. Once we do so, ground, with its very partial order, looks
better as a guide to reality’s layers (as conceived by the layered conception).
Admittedly, the layered conception demands an ordering that is closer to
total than the ordering provided by ground. But patterns among ground’s
partial ordering can bridge the gap between grounds very partial order and
the layered conception’s less partial order.
3 Foundationalism and the Layered Conception
Foundationalism is the easiest bit of the orthodoxy for the fan of the layered
conception to reject. Simply put, the layered conception does not require a
foundation. The Greek philosopher Xenophanes was an early proponent of
the layered conception (Patzia [n.d.], Lesher [1992]). Arguably, he also be-
lieved foundationalism to be false, and that the world consisted of alternating
layers of earth and water.3
Of course, one could build foundationalism into the layered conception,
forming the-layered-conception-with-a-bottom. In so doing, one would make
the layered conception developed via ground incompatible with rejection of
foundationalism about ground. But one certainly need not insist on a bottom
3Xenophanes believed in an infinite temporal descent of watery and earthy stages
(of Rome [2015] attributes this view to Xenophanes in his Refutation of All Heresies:
1.14). Whether this entails anti-foundationalism of ground, will turn on whether tempo-
ral, or causal, dependence can be parlayed into metaphysical dependence.
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layer. The basic idea of a reality structured by relations of dependence does
not require a foundation.
4 Anti-symmetry and the Layered Conception
The basic idea of using ground to generate the layered conception comes from
the following principle:
(The Simple Principle) If x grounds y, then x is at a lower level /
more fundamental than y.
The simple principles gets us from claims about grounding relations be-
tween particulars (facts, objects, or properties) to claims about where those
particulars fit into reality’s layers. To generate the full layered conception,
we still need to discern patterns concerning where certain types of things oc-
cur in reality’s layers. But, via the simple principle, ground gives us a good
start.
The simple principle does not work so well, however, if ground fails to be
antisymmetric. According to the simple principle, if x grounds y, then x is
lower than y. If y grounds x (violating anti-symmetry), then y is lower than
x. And that doesn’t make sense, at least in so far as I understand the layered
conception. Biology can’t be both above and below chemistry.
There are decent prima facie considerations in favor of rejecting the anti-
symmetry of ground. Barnes [MS] argues that we should accept symmetric
dependence in a wide variety of cases, from immanent universals to states
of affairs to mathematical ontology. In one example, she argues that it is
essential to the evacuation at Dunkirk that it is part of World War II. And
it is essential to World War II that it contain the evacuation at Dunkirk. If
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this is correct, it is plausible to maintain that each of World War II and the
evacuation at Dunkirk depend on the other. Voila: symmetric ground!
This is neither the time nor the place to have the fight over whether
ground is or is not antisymmetric. Barnes presents some plausible cases. At
the least, proponents of the theory-combinations Barnes discusses might want
to take advantage of a non antisymmetric (i.e. sometimes symmetric) notion
of ground. For their sake, it’s worth exploring how rejecting the orthodoxy
regarding the anti-symmetry of ground interacts with the layered conception.
I believe that, ultimately, rejection of anti-symmetry for ground does not
impugn ground’s ability to vindicate the layered conception. In fact, cases
of symmetric ground might help us better understand how reality is layered.
I argue for these claims in the remainder of this section.
The simple principle, above, is one way to infer layering from relations of
ground. But once we recognize the possibility of symmetric ground, we can
opt for the following slightly less simple principle.
(The Slightly Less Simple Principle) If x grounds y, and y does
not ground x, then x is more fundamental / at a lower level than y.
The Slightly Less Simple Principle is a clear improvement over the Simple
Principle. If ground is antisymmetric, then the ‘y does not ground x’ clause
in the Less Simple Principle is vacuous, and the Less Simple Principle reduces
to the Simple Principle. But if symmetric ground does occur, the Slightly
Less Simple Principle avoids the problematic result above, where x is both
above and below y in reality’s layering.
In cases of symmetric ground, what should we say about the layering
relations of the items that ground each other? We should not place either
13
above the other. This leaves two options, which we’ve already seen: (i) they
are at the same level or (ii) they are incommensurable. I believe that (i) is
the better option here. x and y are related by ground. It seems quite odd to
say that they bear no relation to each other in reality’s layering. The layering
is still a layering based on dependence. And x and y depend on each other.
I propose we place x and y on the same level.
Considerations involving the transitivity of ground further support plac-
ing x and y on the same level. The transitivity of ground will guarantee
that, in cases of symmetric ground, the symmetric grounders will be at the
pseudo-same level. For any x and y, x and y are at the pseudo-same level in
reality’s layering if and only if for any z, if z is above x, then z is above y, and
if z is below x, then z is below y. In simple terms, two items at the pseudo-
same level are both above, and below, all the same stuff. This does not quite
guarantee sameness of level. x and y might still be incommensurable.
It is worth noting that this case is slightly different than geology-biology
case discussed earlier, in which I argued for incommensurability of level. In
that case, computation lied below biology, but remained incommensurable
with geology. This would not be possible if geology and biology were in-
commensurable but at the pseudo-same level. Their pseudo-sameness would
guarantee that if biology were higher than computation, geology would be
too.
I admit that my arguments leave some space for claiming that symmetric
grounders are incommensurable in level. But given that (a) they are related
by dependence and (b) they are at the pseudo-same level, I believe we should
say that they lie at the same level in reality’s layering.
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5 Irreflexivity and the Layered Conception
Grounding orthodoxy holds that ground is irreflexive: nothing grounds itself.
Jenkins [2011] has challenged the orthodoxy, claiming that it’s better to
leave open the possibility that something could ground itself. For example,
an identity theorist in philosophy of mind might simultaneously claim that
(a) consciousness is identical to electrical flow in the brain’s dorsal stream
and (b) mental phenomena, including consciousness, are grounded in brain
phenomena, such as electrical flow in the dorsal stream. If the orthodoxy is
correct, this position is incoherent: ground is irreflexive. Consciousness can’t
be grounded in electrical flow in the dorsal stream, to which it is identical.
Understandably, Jenkins argues that our conception of ground should not
rule out by fiat the combination of metaphysical views espoused by the en-
visioned identity theorist. We want ground to provide a useful philosophical
tool for conceptualizing various debates in metaphysics. In so far as an ir-
reflexive conception of ground makes unintelligible a plausible and popular
view in the philosophy mind, it fails to accomplish this goal. The best solu-
tion, argues Jenkins, is to give up the irreflexivity of ground. The result is not
that ground is reflexive (i.e. everything grounds itself), but that sometimes,
things do ground themselves.
There are ways to resist this line of thought. But acceptance, in certain
cases, of reflexive ground, seems desirable. Particularly so in light of par-
ticular philosophical views, like the identity theory in philosophy of mind.
How much does giving up the irreflexivity of ground affect ground’s ability
to vindicate the layered conception? The answer is, “Not much.”
In combination with the simple principle, cases of irreflexive ground cause
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problems. Continuing with the identity claim as our example, the two will
entail that conscious experience is above itself (and below itself) in the layered
conception. That’s weird.
Like with symmetric ground, a shift from the simple principle to the
slightly less simple principle saves the day. The slightly less simple principle
avoids the result that conscious experience is above (and below) itself in
reality’s layering.
The choice between an irreflexive conception of ground and a reflexive
conception might be partly terminological. In the semantics of Fine [2012],
weak ground, in which everything grounds itself, is taken as the primitive
notion. Fine does this partly for reasons of simplicity. But we might think
that formal simplicity provides some reason for taking the reflexive concep-
tion of ground to be more fundamental, even if talk of an entity’s grounding
itself rubs against thought of ground as a form of metaphysical explanation
and/or determination.
One important difference between giving up irreflexive ground and giving
up antisymmetric ground is worth noting. If ground is reflexive, i.e. if every-
thing grounds itself, there is no serious challenge to the layered conception.
We need simply shift from the unreflective simple principle to the slight less
simple principle. Such a move will avoid the unsavory implications of cases
of reflexive ground (e.g. that conscious experience is both above and below
itself), but still allow ground to play its intended role in generating the re-
mainder of reality’s layering. On the other hand, if ground is symmetric,
i.e. if every time x grounds y, y grounds x, the goal of using ground to gen-
erate reality’s layering falls into serious jeopardy. There’s no simple fix for
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symmetric ground. (Thankfully, to my knowledge no one has suggested that
ground is symmetric).
The basic thought behind using ground to generate the layered conception
is that if x grounds y, x is lower than y in the layered conception. In the first
instance, ground relates tokens, or particular facts. The layered conception
relates types (as well as tokens of those types). Some theorizing is required
to get from the tokens to the types. Adoption of a reflexive conception of
ground, in which everything grounds itself, requires only minimal modifica-
tion of the basic idea. A shift from the basic idea, expressed in the simple
principle, to a more nuanced version of the same idea via the slightly less
simple principle, does the trick and rescues a reflexive conception of ground’s
ability to generate reality’s layering.
In contrast, symmetric ground, in which every time x grounds y, y also
grounds x, completely voids the basic idea. Ground will never give us the
result that x is above (or below) y in reality’s layering. In the previous
section, I argued that in cases of symmetric ground we should maintain
that the symmetric groundees should be placed at the same level in reality’s
layering. If this is correct, then ground will provide some, but not much,
guide to reality’s layers. Ground will be sufficient for sameness of level. But
some other relation will be required to do the heavy lifting in the generation
of reality’s vertical hierarchy.
In sum, I claim that neither acceptance of particular cases of reflexive
ground nor acceptance of a fully reflexive conception of ground seriously chal-
lenges the ability of ground to vindicate the layered conception. Particular
individual cases of symmetric ground can be easily handled. But a full-blown
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symmetric conception of ground will void ground’s ability to provide reality’s
layering.
6 Intransitivity and the Layered Conception
Lastly, we come to the transitivity of ground, which says that if x grounds
y, and y grounds z, then x grounds z. Schaffer [2012] has challenged this
principle. One of his arguments revolves around a dented sphere. Schaffer
claims that while it’s plausible that (a) the fact that the dented sphere has
a dent grounds that fact that it has determinate shape S and (b) the fact
that the dented sphere has determinate shape S grounds the fact that it
is more-or-less spherical, it is implausible that (c) the fact that the dented
sphere has a dent grounds the fact that it is more-or-less spherical. After all,
writes Schaffer, “the thing is more-or-less spherical despite the minor dent,
not because of it.” (127).
There are ways to resist the argument, but I do not wish to weigh in on
the issue here. Schaffer’s example is prima facie plausible, and he provides
other alleged counterexamples to transitivity. At the least, some will want
to deny the transitivity of ground. For their sake, it’s worth exploring how
such a denial will affect ground’s interaction with the layered conception.
The layered conception’s hierarchical structure is transitive. If biological
phenomena lie above chemical phenomena, and psychological phenomena
lie above the biological, then psychological phenomena lie above chemical
phenomena. We need some transitivity in the layered conception.
Consider a graphical representation of the world’s grounding relations, in
which nodes represent the relata of grounding relations and arrows between
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nodes represent relations of ground. (Arrows point from the ground to the
grounded).
proton p
molecule m
neuron n
electron e
From the graph, we can observe the beginnings of reality’s layering. The
fact that my brain contains proton p lies below the fact that my brain contains
potassium molecule m, which lies below the fact that my brain contains
neuron n. This layering of particular facts proceeds from the physical to the
chemical to the biological. The generation of this layering does not require
an arrow, or a relation of ground, between proton p and neuron n or their
associated facts. A failure of transitivity, say, between the proton and the
neuron, will not interfere with the generation of this layering.
From a formal standpoint, this should be no surprise. For any non-
transitive relation R one can always take the transitive closure of R to gener-
ate a transitive relation R* that will contain R as a subset, in the sense that
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if Rab, then R*ab. Even if ground is not transitive, we can take ground’s
transitive closure to generate ground*. But we need not resort to such formal
tricks.
The layered conception involves a layering of fundamentality. The chem-
ical is more fundamental than the biological. “More fundamental than”
is transitive, as are “higher than” and “lower than” in reality’s layering.
Ground and fundamentality are linked by the simple and/or slightly less prin-
ciple we’ve discussed. Grounding relations have implications for relations of
relative fundamentality and for reality’s layering. But ground can fail to be
transitive, and even be anti-transitive, yet still have these implications for
the transitive relations for “more/less fundamental than” and “lower/higher
in reality’s layering than”. Assuming this transitivity, a double application
of the simple (and/or slightly less simple) principle yields the result that if
x grounds y, and y grounds z, then x is more fundamental than y, and x is
lower than z in reality’s layering. This is so even if x does not ground z.
One final worry goes as follows. If ground is not transitive, but the hierar-
chical structure of the layered conception is, what is the layered conception
a hierarchy of? The preceding discussion should alleviate the worry. The
layered conception’s hierarchical structure captures relations of relative fun-
damentality, which have an intimate relation to ground, despite the fact that
they remain transitive even when ground is not.
We can get the transitive structure constitutive of the layered conception
even if ground fails to be transitive. The transitivity can come in later,
with the relations (“more/less fundamental than”, “lower/higher than”) that
properly constitute reality’s layering, and to which ground is a guide.
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7 Conclusion
The key to making unorthodox views about the formal properties of ground
compatible with the layered conception is to recognize that there is a gap
between what grounds what and the layered conception. One can’t just
“read off” reality’s layering from the facts about ground. The move from
what grounds what to reality’s layering is substantive. I believe we should
be optimistic about gleaning from the facts about ground a useful and infor-
mative structure that roughly matches our pre-theoretic conception of how
the features of reality are layered.
First, principles linking ground and layering, or fundamentality, such as
the simple and/or slightly less simple principle, give us a healthy start in gen-
erating a layering from ground. But the task of evaluating the patterns in the
grounding relations between particulars, and gleaning from those patterns a
layering of the various properties, and types of properties (geological, biolog-
ical), remains. Second, we may have to abandon some of our pre-theoretic
ideas about reality’s layering. I argued that we should abandon the claim
that reality’s layering generates a total order. Geology and biology are in-
commensurable; neither lies above or below the other. The layering’s order
is closer to total than ground’s order. But both are partial.
The gap between ground and layering both helps and harms. It harms
because it makes the task of discerning reality’s layering more difficult. Even
after we possess a complete story of what grounds what, we must still do
philosophical work to determine what is more fundamental than what. It
helps because it permits the layering to be well-behaved even when ground is
not. For example, symmetric cases of ground don’t force us to claim that the
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symmetric groundees each lie above (or below) the other in reality’s layering.
The grounding orthodoxy ensures that ground behaves nicely. It will be a
good little transitive, antisymmetric, irreflexive, well-founded relation. This
obedient behavior ensures the absence of problematic grounding structures,
such as loops, that create problems when we move from ground to reality’s
layering. But the heretics are out there. Not all theorists of ground believe
in the orthodoxy. I’ve covered a variety of reasons to doubt various parts
of that orthodoxy. These theorists will probably be willing to give up some
nice behavior in order to have a theoretical tool that can do the metaphysical
work they want done. For this reason alone, it’s worth exploring how reality’s
layering might go if we accept an unorthodox view about ground and want
to maintain an intimate link between ground the layered conception.
There are good reasons for the orthodoxy. The principles seem prima
facie correct. It’s convenient to have a formally well-behaved relation. But
there are good reasons to doubt the orthodoxy. Cases like Jenkins’ reflexive
dependence of pains on brains, or Barnes’ symmetric dependence of World
War II and the evacuation at Dunkirk, should force us to seriously reconsider.
There is something to the idea of mutual dependence in those cases. This
dependence should at least be taken into consideration when we move to
generate reality’s layering. A non-orthodox conception of ground will better
reflect whatever it was about dependence that Barnes and Jenkins latched
on to, and which we want reflected in the reality’s layering. Even staunchly
orthodox views, when they move from the grounding graph to reality’s lay-
ering, might decide to reflect that symmetric relation in reality’s layering,
even if they do not choose to call it ’ground’. In this way a non-orthodox
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conception of ground better reflects reality’s relations of dependence, and en-
ables the generation of a more, rather than less, accurate, picture of reality’s
layering.
In the end, we might reject the arguments of Barnes, Bliss, Jenkins,
and Schaffer, and maintain that the orthodoxy about ground is correct. But
knowing that the layered conception is perfectly compatible with the heretical
views that challenge the orthodoxy should grease the wheels for rejecting
that orthodoxy (a move with which I have considerable sympathy). A non-
orthodox view of ground can not only have a nice layering of reality, but the
non-orthodox view is, in various ways, better suited to that layering. The
grounding heretics can have their (layered) cake and eat it too.
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